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REINVENTING EUGENICS: REPRODUCTIVE
CHOICE AND LAW REFORM AFTER WORLD WAR II
MARY ZIEGLER!
[M]any feel that it is inconsistent to require both that the client consent and
be feebleminded. One county specifically asks: “Could some of the ‘red
tape’ be cut in regard to the consent of the feebleminded adult? We are
thinking of a mother of four children, born out of wedlock, who is
definitely feebleminded and who will not give consent for sterilization....”
[M]any surveyed felt compulsory powers should be available.... [B]ut if
compulsory powers were exercised, a great deal of hostility might be
stirred up which could jeopardize the whole existence of the law.1

When the United States Supreme Court decided Skinner v. United States,
some observers saw the case as the beginning of the end of the movement for
eugenic legal reform.2 The term eugenic, coined in 1883 by the British geneticist
Francis Galton, described a belief that law could be used to improve the quality of
the population.3 When the Court had last considered a Due Process or Equal
Protection challenge to compulsory eugenic sterilization law in 1927, only one
justice dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold the statute.4 Only fifteen
years after the Buck Court stated that “three generations of imbeciles are enough,”5
the Skinner Court described the right to reproduce as “one of the basic civil rights
of man.”6
Many scholars have seen this apparently dramatic shift in the Court’s position
as evidence of the influence of World War II on American reproductive law.7
During the war, widespread revulsion to the Nazi political program provoked

!
I would like especially to thank Ken Mack, Jon Hanson, and Adrian Vermeule for their comments and
help during work on this article.
1 MOYA WOODSIDE, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 71 (Univ. of North Carolina Press
1950).
2 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also James B. O’Hara and T. Howland Sanks,
Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20 (1956).
3 See generally FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
(Dent & Dutton 1907)(1883).
4 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
5 Id. at 207..
6 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
7 See, e.g., Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the
Socialization of American Law, 1900-1930, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 67-100 (1998).

319

@BCL@6C015DC4.DOC

320

CARDOZO JOURNAL OF LAW & GENDER

5/6/2008 7:04:32 AM

[Vol. 14:319

serious criticism of American sterilization laws similar to those enforced in
Germany.8 As a result of this disapproval, the eugenic reform movement is seen to
have no longer influenced American reproductive law after the War.9
A close examination of pro-eugenic organizations after the War tells a
significantly different story. Rather than disappearing from the political scene,
these organizations appear to have transformed both themselves and the very idea
of eugenic law.
When originally formed, these organizations reflected ideas that had first
been discussed in Europe by scholars like Galton. He proposed that law could
improve the quality of the population primarily by preventing physically, mentally,
and morally flawed persons from reproducing.10 When Galton was first writing in
the nineteenth century, eugenic writings often reflected concern among the upper
classes about the rising influence of the popular classes on politics, finance, and
culture.11 At the same time, those eugenic advocates like Galton rejected what
German theorist Max Nordau termed pessimism, a belief that nothing could be
done to prevent perceived cultural decline, and proposed instead that the law be
used to help improve eugenic stock.12
As eugenic theory became influential in the United States in the 1890s,
leading eugenic proponents increasingly adopted August Weismann’s theory that
all defects were, in some way, irreversible.13 It was possible that living in a poor
environment or engaging in a moral indiscretion could deform a person’s genetic
matter, Weismann theorized, but a better environment could not remedy the
defect.14 Once created, a defect would be passed on indefinitely from generation to
generation.15
Given the perceived urgency of the threat Weismann described, many
lawmakers were primarily interested in devising legal solutions to the problem
presented by the multiplication of the “unfit.” In the middle decades of the
nineteenth century, several states experimented with homes for the mentally
8 See, e.g., id.; cf. Michael Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions,
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 54 (1996) (explaining the effects of anti-Nazi ideology on popular and legal views on
religious tolerance).
9 See, e.g., Willrich, supra note 7, at 97.
10 See Francis Galton, Types and Their Inheritance, 32 NATURE 507, 507-09 (1885).
11 See, e.g., Donald Pickens, The Sterilization Movement: The Search for Purity in Mind and State,
28 PHYLON 78, 79 (1967).
12 MAX NORDAU, DEGENERATION 150 (Univ. of Nebraska Press 1895) Michael Willrich has
offered an account of the use of eugenic theory to justify an exercise of unprecedented legal power in
Chicago’s Municipal Court. See Willrich, supra note 6, at 67-100. Other historians of Progressive-era
legal reforms have emphasized the expansion of legal authority in that period. See generally MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
(Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
13 AUGUST WEISMANN, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEXUAL REPRODUCTION IN THE THEORY OF
NATURAL SELECTION, IN ESSAYS UPON HEREDITY AND KINDRED BIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS (E.B. Poulton,
S. Schöland, and A.E. Shipley Eds. Clarendon, Uk: Oxford, 1889), 277.
14 Id. at 65.
15 Id.
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retarded.16 However, by the 1890s, many critics had become convinced that
administrative segregation was ineffective and unnecessarily stigmatizing.17
Indeed, several states adopted so-called eugenic marriage laws, which allowed only
those who could pass a battery of blood tests to obtain a marriage license.18
For a variety of reasons, eugenic marriage laws proved to be a spectacular
failure. Because the laws required equipment that was often too rare and too
expensive for most local physicians to acquire, the laws were unpopular as they
prevented so many people from obtaining marriage licenses.19 More importantly,
the laws were seen to be ineffective from a eugenic standpoint: morally unfit
persons were widely believed to have sexual intercourse outside of marriage and so
would be unaffected by the denial of a marriage license.20 To some observers, the
need for a more coercive law was apparent.21
Between 1915 and 1940, several states responded by introducing compulsory
eugenic sterilization laws.22 Focused on people housed in state institutions, the
laws authorized the sterilization of a loosely defined group that included those
individuals thought to be insane, handicapped, or sexually promiscuous.23
The rise of such laws in the 1910s can be partly explained by the emergence
of Progressive politics.24 Many Progressives shared with eugenic theorists a belief
in the superior knowledge of experts, a suspicion of rights-based arguments made
by the federal courts, and a conviction that the needs of individuals had to be
subordinated to those of the community.25
Eugenic compulsory sterilization laws were still frequently applied following
the decline of Progressive politics.26 After the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s
compulsory sterilization law in Buck v. Bell in 1927, a significant number of states
introduced sterilization laws of their own.27 The decade before the beginning of
World War II was, for the most part, a successful one for proponents of eugenic
legal reform.
It was not until the middle of World War II, that eugenic sterilization laws
16

Pickens, supra note 11, at 84.
Id.
18 See, e.g., Eugenic Law Awes Cupid, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1914, at 6.
19 See, e.g., Eugenic Law Flat Failure, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1916, at 14.
20 See Charles Davenport, State Laws Limiting Marriage Selection Examined in Light of Eugenics,
EUGENICS RECORD OFFICE BULLETIN NO. 9 (1913).
21 See id.
22 See J. H. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION 49 (The MacMillian Co. 1932).
23 See id.
24 See, e.g., Willrich, supra note 7.
25 See Pickens, supra note 11, at 268-275.
26 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) The second generation of compulsory eugenic
sterilization laws appeared most often in the western and southern parts of the United States. See also
EDWARD LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 123 (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1995); see also IAN DOWBIGGIN, KEEPING AMERICA SANE: PSYCHIATRY AND EUGENICS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 1880-1940 104, 125-126 (Cornell Univ. Press 2003).
27 See O’Hara, supra note 2, at 40-41
17
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came under attack. Newspapers in the 1940s increasingly mentioned sterilization
laws only in the context of the Nazi regime.28 Many major American newspapers
provided extensive, often scathing criticism of Nazi sterilization laws. 29 Nazi
sterilization policies were seen to be totalitarian and American eugenicists often
had trouble arguing that their own sterilization laws were any different. Writing to
the Washington Post, the Reverend F. J. Connell responded to a letter that had
advocated the sterilization of the unfit:
In his letter of January 10, Dr. H. Curtiss Wood recommends the
sterilization of persons regarded as unfit for parenthood, particularly the
mentally defective. . . .The argument of Dr. Wood is very similar to that
[argument] presented to the Reichstag in support of the sterilization policy
which was put into operation in Nazi Germany on Jan. 1, 1934.... It would
be interesting to know if Dr. Wood favors the entire Nazi policy or just this
feature.30

Many American eugenicists had trouble responding to critiques like the one
framed by Reverend Connell, and popular support for eugenics declined
accordingly.
Yet the association with Nazism did not spell the end of eugenic influence on
reproductive law. Traditional histories of eugenics often conclude that World War
II effectively marked the end of eugenic regulation of reproduction and sexual
behavior.31 This article will argue instead that, in some cases, proponents of
eugenic sterilization laws modernized eugenic legislation to reflect the changing
norms of the post-war era.
Public awareness of Nazi racial policies changed but did not end laws
allowing the government to control parenthood. Nazi sterilization policy had been
condemned by many for being totalitarian, overbroad, racially motivated, and
entirely compulsory.32 Yet, despite a potentially damning connection to Nazi
practices, some social workers and legislators invoked a recent crisis in the number
of out-of-wedlock births to justify an expansion of laws designed to deter those
seen to be morally unfit from having children.33

28

Sterilization of Criminals and Insane Favored, 8-2, THE ATLANTA CONST., May 23, 1937.
See, e.g., Harold Callenders, Goebbels’ Tactics Hint at Nazi Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 27, 1942, at
13; see also Nazified Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1942, at E1; see also Dana Adams Schmidt, Nazi
Medical Horrors Revealed At New Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1947, at 102; B. D. Arlington,
Sterilization of Germans, WASH. POST, Sep. 10, 1944, at B4.
30 Rev. F. J. Connell, Sterilization, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1947, at 6.
31 See Willrich, supra note 7, at 98; but cf LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 196-212 (Univ. of Illinois Press 2002) (arguing that
the influence of eugenics in law declined but that eugenic thought influenced the evolution of Planned
Parenthood and the birth control movement).
32 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 71.
33 See RICKIE SOLLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE; SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V.
WADE 13 (Routledge 1992); WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 211 (Univ. of California
Press 1965).
29
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A spike in out-of-wedlock births made the compulsory sterilization of “unfit”
unwed mothers appear a more attractive legislative option. Between 1950 and
1967, more than 12 states considered a measure to compulsorily sterilize unwed
mothers, and yet all of these bills failed to pass.34 Similarly, there is evidence that
some important members of the Senate seriously considered introducing
compulsory sterilization legislation but decided against such a strategy because of
the perceived unpopularity of compulsory sterilization laws.35 Even North
Carolina, a state still widely applying its compulsory eugenic sterilization law from
1950 to 1965, was unable to expand its law.36
If there was widespread support for such a eugenic law, then why did the
attempts to pass a compulsory law universally fail? Moya Woodside, a British
sociologist and commentator on North Carolina’s law, argued that an effective
eugenic law could not be compulsory but would instead have to respect free
choice.37 “Laws providing for voluntary sterilization in democratic countries bear
no resemblance to the German experience,” Woodside wrote. “[The] preservation
of individual liberty does more in the long run to encourage sterilization as a
measure of social betterment.”38
The laws that developed from 1950-1967 confirmed that Woodside’s
intuition was insightful. As noted, a traditional history of eugenics often concludes
that World War II spelled the end of eugenic influence on the law. This article will
argue instead that World War II required eugenic laws, at least in appearance, to
respect some form of reproductive choice.
The new emphasis on choice forced pro-eugenic organizations to transform
their strategies and rhetoric. Because eugenic legal theory had been criticized for
being political rather than scientific, some pro-eugenic organizations began, in the
1950s, to renounce lobbying in order to focus on funding research that
demonstrated the benefits of improving the “quality” of the population. The
leaders of other organizations identified less controversial programs of legal reform
that they believed would have the same effects as would an openly eugenic
program. Between 1950 and 1966, pro-eugenic organizations increasingly saw
population control reform as an ideal program of this sort. The platform that
resulted from these changes appeared to better account for individual choice but
was also more openly racist than earlier eugenic legal reform projects had been.
Perhaps most importantly, the new reform efforts offered their own
definitions of reproductive choice. Many people thought to be socially inadequate
were seen as unable to make the right reproductive decisions themselves, and proeugenic organizations advised their volunteers to omit or favorably characterize the
34
35
36
37
38

See, e.g., House Backs Senate Over Banking Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1962, at B2.
Bill Urging Sterilization Hit, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1960, at A9.
WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 24.
Id.
Id.
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facts about birth control or sterilization and to take advantage of emotional or
physical weakness in order to assure that the “right choice” was made.
Thus, it is not the case that eugenics was no longer a significant influence on
American reproductive law after World War II. Rather, pro-eugenic organizations
adapted to the new political climate that emerged after 1945. Instead of defending
the merits of state coercion in reproductive matters, pro-eugenic organizations
themselves now sought to define reproductive choice.
By studying the introduction and failure of expanded compulsory sterilization
laws in the 1950s and 1960s, Part I examines the political rejection of
governmental coercion in reproductive matters. Part II studies the alternative
strategies adopted by two of the most influential post-war pro-eugenic
organizations, Human Betterment and the Population Council. By evaluating the
workings of a post-war compulsory sterilization statute, Part III demonstrates the
effects of the new political emphasis on reproductive choice on existing laws. Part
IV is a brief conclusion.
I. COMPULSORY STERILIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
A traditional account of eugenics in law often concludes that anti-Nazi
ideology doomed eugenic sterilization laws that were themselves similar to laws
used by the Nazis. The anti-Nazi ideology theory is in many ways a sensible one.
Eugenics was a much less high profile issue in the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1950
and 1960, the term eugenic or any version of it appeared 774 times in the New York
Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, or the Los Angeles Times,
compared to 1,744 times between 1930 and 1940.39 The New York Times and the
Chicago Tribune covered Nazi sterilization policies extensively and often
negatively.40 From the perspective of a current observer, it might seem inevitable
that American sterilization policies would be condemned if Nazi sterilization
policies were.
The Supreme Court opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma plausibly supports an
anti-Nazi ideology argument. In Skinner, the Court struck down an Oklahoma
statute that provided for the sterilization of specified groups of repeat offenders.41
Although Skinner has come to stand for the existence of a substantive Due Process
right to procreation,42 the decision was made on Equal Protection grounds. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, concluded that the distinctions drawn by the statute

39 Proquest Historical Newspapers search by the author (June 28, 2006) (receiving over 1,700 hits
in search for term eugenic in above-mentioned newspapers).
40 See text accompanying supra notes 26-29 (discussing problems associated with Nazi sterilization
programs).
41 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
42 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973).
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between offenders who committed similar and equally serious crimes could not
survive rational basis review.43
In spite of the limited scope of the holding, there is evidence to support a
contention that Skinner was an anti-Nazi decision. Press coverage of Nazi
sterilization policy peaked in 1941,44 a year before Skinner came out. The Court
used rhetoric that could support an anti-Nazi reading, condemning Oklahoma’s law
as interfering too much with “a sensitive and important area of human rights...” and
depriving “individuals of a right which is basic to the... race—the right to have
offspring.”45
But those who supported eugenic sterilization laws had powerful motivations,
often believing intensely in the rightness of eugenics whether or not the Nazis were
associated with it. These motivations might have made it easier to see distinctions
between Nazi sterilization policies and American sterilization laws.
Skinner does not preclude the drawing of such a distinction. Significantly,
Skinner struck down a law providing for the forcible sterilization of felons who had
offended more than three times.46 The statute in question was punitive in nature.
In fact, openly punitive sterilization laws had been struck down by state courts in
the 1910s and condemned by eugenicists in the 1930s.47 Skinner can be read as a
continuation of this trend as opposed to a change in course. It is notable that the
Skinner Court did not strike down Buck v. Bell.48 Indeed, in 1942, the Court might
not have been willing to strike down sterilization laws of the sort upheld in Buck.
Moreover, Skinner had a narrow holding. Oklahoma’s sterilization law was
struck down on Equal Protection grounds, mostly because the law targeted some
felons while leaving alone felons who had committed crimes that were just as
serious.49 In fact, the Court explicitly upheld and distinguished Buck v. Bell, which
it saw as involving a sufficiently rational law. Only Justice Jackson, writing in
concurrence, raised the possibility that there might be something wrong with any
compulsory sterilization law.50 It is likely that the Skinner Court had considered
the evils of Nazi sterilization laws, but the Court was not ready to condemn more
popular eugenic policies. For the Court, some eugenic policies were acceptable and
some were not. Some laws had been tainted by Nazism and some had not.

43

Id.
Proquest Historical Newspapers search by the author (September 14, 2006) (search hits for Nazi
sterilization in period between 1940 and 1943)..
45 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
46 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
47 See Mickel v. Heinrichs, 262 Fed. 688 (D.C. Nevada 1918); see also Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed.
413 (Iowa 1914); see also WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 160 (“It is unfortunate that some states in the
U.S. still sanction sterilization or castration for certain classes of criminals and sexual offenders. This
creates the impression that sterilization is a punitive measure [which creates] distrust.”).
48 See especially Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540-541, 544-555.
49 Id. at 542.
50 Id. at 545 (Stone, J., Concurring).
44
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The laws passed between 1950 and 1967 to address the illegitimacy problem
help explain what was considered objectionable about Nazi reproductive policy.
For various reasons, eugenic laws had long targeted unwed mothers on public
assistance. Some legislators and theorists emphasized the “unnecessary” costs of
paying relief to unwed mothers and their children. 51 Other eugenic theorists
stressed that women who repeatedly had sexual intercourse outside of wedlock
were necessarily defective and would have defective children.52 Following the
theory of August Weismann, these theorists argued that immoral sexual behavior
could deform a woman’s germ plasm and, in turn, produce defects in her
children.53
By the 1950s, many no longer believed that unwed mothers were always
hereditarily defective, but it was still often thought that the children of unwed
mothers themselves had social problems, either because of bad heredity, exposure
to a bad environment, or both.54 In the 1950s, a variety of newspapers suggested
that America was experiencing an illegitimacy crisis.55 A greater proportion of
unwed mothers were reported to be white,56 and a greater proportion of those on
welfare were believed to be unwed mothers.57 Elyce Ferster wrote in 1966 that the
new explanations and “arguments advanced in favor [of such compulsory
sterilization] are the same as those used by proponents of eugenic sterilization.
Society has the right to prevent itself from being swamped by mental illness,
mental retardation, crime, poverty, etc.”58 In Ferster’s view, only the rhetoric of
lawmakers had changed. Ferster stated that “eugenicists argued that the prevention
of procreation was necessary because children of parents having these defects
would have the same defects by reason of heredity. Now the claim is that children
will have the same defects because the parents are too socially inadequate.”59
As Ferster predicted, between 1950 and 1967, many state legislatures were
attracted to these arguments, but they ultimately rejected a compulsory sterilization

51 Baltimore Welfare Denounced, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1947 at 1 (explaining argument that
welfare encouraged illegitimacy); see also William Sheridan, Jr., Illegitimacy and ADC, CHI. TRIB.,
May 9, 1955 at 20 (state legislator condemning costs imposed by unwed mothers on welfare)..
52 See, e.g., PAUL POPENOE, THE FEEBLEMINDED, IN COLLECTED PAPERS ON EUGENIC
STERILIZATION IN CALIFORNIA (PASADENA: THE HUMAN BETTERMENT FOUNDATION, 1928), 321.
53 Scott Christianson, Bad Seed or Bad Science, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003, at B9 (describing
Dugdale’s use of female “licentiousness” and “harlotry” as markers of eugenic defect); see also PHILLIP
R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 14 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1991).
54 See Elyce Zenoff Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit -- Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J.
591, 610 (1966).
55 See, e.g., Sterilization Urged to Cut Costs of ADC, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1961, at 26; See MIMI
ABRAMOWITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO THE PRESENT 320-321 (South End Press 1996).
56 See ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 55, at 321.
57 See id.
58 Ferster, supra note 54, at 610.
59 Id.
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law for unwed mothers. It is important to consider what led to the rejection of
sterilization programs some legislators so obviously found appealing.
Part of the attraction was related to the limits placed on existing sterilization
laws. Although many states still had compulsory sterilization statutes on the books
in 1957, most of these laws were rarely applied.60 Almost all of them were
ultimately repealed between 1968 and 1975.61 The states that applied their
compulsory sterilization laws more vigorously could often do so only after clearing
several procedural hurdles.62 In 1950, then, it was difficult for almost all of the
thirty states with compulsory sterilization laws on the books to sterilize “morally
unfit” women. States that still wanted to reduce the number of unfit children had to
find other legal means to discourage women perceived to be socially inadequate
from having more children.
Nonetheless, these states continued to consider expanding or adopting new
compulsory sterilization legislation. Many passed alternatives to compulsory
sterilization shortly after the defeat of such legislation or public outcry at its
introduction. The experience of these states helps to illustrate both that eugenics
still influenced American reproductive law and that laws reflecting this influence
had to respect reproductive choice.
A. Virginia, North Carolina, and “Voluntary” Sterilization
Both Virginia and North Carolina faced proposals to compulsorily sterilize
unwed mothers irrespective of whether they qualified as feebleminded or insane
under the state’s eugenic sterilization law.
In 1956, Representative E. Ralph James of Hampton, Virginia, introduced a
proposal that would have allowed the superintendent of public welfare in any
county to petition a local judge to order mothers of more than one illegitimate child
to be sterilized unless they could show that they should not be sterilized.63 This
bill was defeated, but three further sterilization proposals were introduced in 1960,
including two compulsory sterilization proposals.64 These proposals were again
defeated. In 1962, another compulsory sterilization bill was introduced, but this
time, the state passed a voluntary sterilization bill.65
North Carolina followed a similar path. Representative W. M. Jolly
introduced bills in 1956, 1958, and 1963 that would have expanded compulsory

60 See O’Hara and Sanks, supra note 2 (Three states, North Carolina, Virginia, and California,
continued applying their sterilization laws to more than 300 people per year between 1940 and 1957.).
61 See generally NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER ANATOMY, AND THE
SCIENCE OF NATIONALISM (Univ. of Minnesota Press 2003).
62 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 30-32 (Woodside explains the frustrations of officials
administering a compulsory statute in the face of various procedural requirements.).
63 Julius Paul, The Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals: Current Attacks on Illegitimacy and
the AFDC, 3 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 92, 97 (1968).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 98.
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sterilization legislation to cover “grossly sexually delinquent persons.”66 The Jolly
bill provided that mothers of unwed children be brought before the State Eugenics
board and be required to demonstrate why they should not be sterilized.67 After the
birth of a third illegitimate child, there would be a rebuttable presumption in favor
of sterilization.68 North Carolina rejected these proposals not because state
legislators believed that unwed mothers could produce fit children, but rather
because they believed that compulsory sterilization was an ineffective means of
stemming the tide of unfit parents.69 Dr. John C. Burwell, a member of the neoeugenic Human Betterment League of North Carolina, wrote:
Recent legislative attempts in North Carolina to ameliorate the problem of
illegitimacy by some form of compulsory legislation may be...
detrimental... to those of us interested in voluntary sterilization.
Detrimental in that these attempts leave an implication in the public mind
that any consideration of sterilization is on a compulsory basis.70

B. Penalties and Wrong Choices
At one point, other states considered compulsory sterilization in addition to
legislation that would impose a short prison term and a fine on unwed mothers. In
Illinois, for example, state Senator George M. Brydia proposed a compulsory
sterilization provision for unwed mothers.71 Several alternative bills were met with
greater approval, including Senate Bill No. 1066, which provided for a one-year
prison sentence and a fine for women who had a second illegitimate child and a
three to five-year sentence for mothers of three or more illegitimate children, and
House Bill No. 1561, which allowed the Family Court to remove existing children
from the custody of an unwed mother.72
Similar proposals passed in other states after related compulsory sterilization
measures failed. In Louisiana, a 1958 commission charged with addressing the
state’s illegitimacy problem considered, but ultimately rejected, a compulsory
sterilization measure on the grounds that such laws were “intrinsically evil,
completely immoral and violative of all concepts of Christianity.” 73 The
commission recommended, and the state eventually adopted, Act 75, which instead
provided for a one-year prison sentence and a fine designed to deter unfit parents
from having children.74

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 92; see also Ellen Key Blunt, Sterilization Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1965, at C1.
Paul, supra note 63, at 92-93.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 93-94
Id. at 94.
Sterilization Urged to Cut Costs of ADC, supra note 55, at 26.
Paul, supra note 63, at 81-82.
Id. at 83 (quoting Report of the Committee (Rep. Walter Chachere, Chairman)).
Id. at 84.
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Similarly, Maryland first considered compulsory sterilization as a way to
limit unfit parenthood and only later resorted to criminal penalty legislation.75
Senator John L. Sanford, Jr. introduced a bill in 1960 which provided for a one
thousand dollar fine or three-year prison sentence, a permanent loss of child
custody, and a bar on receipt of welfare funds, as well as compulsory sterilization
of unwed mothers who continued to have illegitimate children.76 The bill easily
passed in the Senate but was defeated in the House of Delegates.77 Delegate
Russell Hickman introduced a bill in 1963 which provided for voluntary
sterilization and compulsory eugenic sterilization of the mentally deficient.78
Ultimately, neither of these bills passed.79 Delaware introduced legislation in the
1950s and again in the 1960s, under which an unwed mother would have to be
sterilized in order to be eligible for welfare payments.80 Similarly, in Iowa, in
December of 1963, state Senator Howard Buck proposed to a legislative committee
that the state sterilize all unwed mothers who received welfare payments.81
The lesson taken from the failure of these laws is that a criminal penalty
divorced from a sterilization provision, would be more likely to pass. It had
become clear that a compulsory sterilization law was no longer politically feasible.
In Mississippi, lawmakers learned a similar lesson. Representative David Glass
introduced a bill in 1958 which would require mothers of two or more illegitimate
children to be sterilized if a Chancery Court determined that the “immorality of
said female [was] detrimental to the state or the community.”82 Although this bill
died on the House Calendar, a related bill was introduced in 1964 by W. B. Meek,
which allowed unwed mothers to submit to compulsory sterilization or a prison
term.83
Apparently, this bill still did not appear to confer real choice on sterilization
candidates: the bill generated considerable backlash from local civil rights
organizations and voluntary sterilization advocates. Letters to the editor published
in Newsweek magazine similarly condemned the coercive aspects of the law.84 A
student advocacy group began an influential campaign against the bill85 that played
up connections between compulsory sterilization in Mississippi and the Nazi

75 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY, STATE OF MARYLAND
26 (1961).
76 Paul, supra note 63, at 84-86.
77 Id. at 85.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 85-86.
80 See Paul, supra note 63, at 80.
81 Id. at 82.
82 Id. at 88.
83 Id. at 89.
84 Id. at 90; see also Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 20, n.5, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496).
85 See Paul, supra note 63, at 90.
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regime.86 Were Mississippi to seek to achieve the same eugenic purpose without
resorting to compulsory sterilization, it seemed likely that such legislation would
not create the same resistance. This appears to have been an accurate prediction:
Mississippi was able to pass a bill that provided for a fine and prison sentence for
mothers of two or more illegitimate children.87
It is worth noting that, in the same period, several states hardened their
criminal penalties regarding illegitimacy, and perhaps for the same reasons.
Between 1950 and 1961, Maryland, Georgia, Mississippi, Delaware, Alabama, and
Massachusetts passed new laws punishing illegitimacy, expanded existing criminal
laws, or made the penalties under existing law harsher.88 Illinois also considered
passing a law criminalizing unwed motherhood for AFDC recipients.89 As noted,
Maryland and Mississippi imposed fines and prison terms on any woman who had
more than two illegitimate children.90 In 1956, Georgia made abandonment of
children a misdemeanor only if the children were illegitimate.91
Unlike a sterilization law, a criminal illegitimacy law was more often seen to
respect choice. Nazi sterilization laws had been condemned for being compulsory.
In contrast, criminal illegitimacy laws gave notice of condemned conduct and then
punished wrong choices after they were made. Maryland’s law punished only
women who had continued to make “bad choices” by having more than a certain
number of illegitimate children.92 Criminal neglect or abandonment laws also
framed penalties in terms of reproductive choice: either a person could make the
right choice, or she would choose to be punished. Lawmakers could create
incentives to make the right choices without compelling anyone not to have a child.
Thus, an illegimacy law could accomplish indirectly what compulsory sterilization
laws had accomplished.
Moreover, the political ramifications of a compulsory sterilization law were
now clear. When several states introduced compulsory sterilization laws, many
observers condemned the use of governmental coercion in private reproductive
matters.93 Nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that the organizations and programs
in place after World War II no longer reflected a eugenic influence. Julius Paul, an
authority on the campaign for compulsory sterilization between 1950 and 1967,
86

Id.
Id.
88 See Bill Subjecting Unwed Mothers to 2 Yrs Prison Ok’d, CHI. DEF., May 2, 1959, at 2; BELL,
supra note 33, at 210-215; Ga. L. 1956 §74-9901 (1956); Bill to Curb Illegitimacy is Signed in Miss.,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1964, at 28; Mass. G.L. c. 273 §15 (1963); Ward v. State, 170 So. 2d 500, 502
(Ala. Ct. App. 1964) (evaluating a statutory increase in the abandonment penalty regarding illegitimate
children to $100 per incident).
89 Sterilization Urged, supra note 55, at 26.
90 See text accompanying supra note 79, 87 (discussing use of criminal penalties for mothers of
illegitimate children).
91 See Williams v. State, 98 S.E. 2d 373 (Ga. 1957).
92 See Bill Subjecting, supra note 88, at 2.
93 See, e.g., text accompanying supra notes 77, 83 (discussing failure of sterilization bills for
unwed mothers).
87

@BCL@6C015DC4.DOC

2008]

5/6/2008 7:04:32 AM

REINVENTING EUGENICS

331

explained in 1968 that the effort to pass such laws or equivalents to them
represented only a slight change in the focus of eugenic legal reformers: “[w]hereas
earlier eugenic efforts were aimed at cutting off the ‘defective germ plasm’ before
it ‘drowns us,’ current efforts would be aimed at cutting off the defective germ
plasm and welfare payments.”94
In the wake of the perceived illegitimacy crisis, legislators interested in
improving the “quality” of the population were forced to find alternatives to the use
of overt coercion. The definition of choice that emerged in alternative proposals
was a narrow one, but it was the goal of pro-eugenic organizations active in the
1950s and 1960s to change this definition. Part II of this note considers the work of
two of the most influential pro-eugenic organizations in order to clarify the changes
in the debates that shaped American reproductive law.
II. THE REINVENTION OF EUGENIC ADVOCACY
A. The Population Council and Contraceptive Incompetence
Founded in 1952, the Population Council was formed partly by leaders of the
eugenic legal reform movement who intended to create a new kind of organization
in response to post-war politics: an organization that would prevent overall
population growth and preserve the “quality” of the population.95 At the
organization’s founding conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, members
emphasized a broad range of potential goals, including research on world food
supply, alternative energy sources, and alternative methods of contraception.96
Nonetheless, a significant number of founding members, including Frederick
Osborn, Kingsley Davis, and Frank Notestein, maintained their ties with the
eugenic legal reform movement.97
Not surprisingly, these members continued to endorse eugenic goals, but they
now characterized those goals as matters of population control. The Council’s
evolution offers a powerful example of how pro-eugenic groups redefined
themselves and their programs in order to ensure their political survival. Members
of the organization worked to achieve this goal in three ways. First, the leaders of
the Council deemphasized openly eugenic projects. Relying on a theory that the
poorest and least eugenically fit individuals were often the most fertile, leaders of
the Council believed that the quality of the population would be improved if overall
population growth was checked. Second, instead of disavowing the idea that the
law could be used to improve the quality of the population, leaders of the
organization argued in favor of a kind of voluntary eugenics. They asserted that the
94

See Paul, supra note 63, at 101.
John D. Rockefeller III, On the Origins of the Population Council, 3 POPULATION & DEV. REV.
493, 493 (1977).
96 Id. at 495-496.
97 See id.
95
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quality of the population could be improved if otherwise “incompetent” people
were assisted in making the right choices. Finally, the organization’s leaders
concluded that the Council could campaign for eugenic legal reform only after
convincing the public that the organization focused on objective scientific research
rather than on lobbying.
These ideas first emerged at a meeting sponsored by the National Academy
of Science in the summer of 1952.98 The demographers, biologists, and geneticists
present agreed that a potential decline in the quality of the population was
integrally related to the overall population growth.99 The organization’s founder,
John D. Rockefeller III, explained: “[t]here was a brief discussion of the problem of
‘quality.’ It was felt that this was part of the background of the questions to which
the committee devoted its time. Modern civilization has reduced natural selection,
saving more ‘weak’ lives and allowing them to reproduce.”100 Among other goals,
Council members agreed to pursue research in both the qualitative and quantitative
aspects of population in the United States.101
Recognizing the connection between eugenic goals and issues of population
control was politically significant for the Council. Although founded largely by
eugenicists, the organization was openly identified only with population control.
The reasons for this were straightforward. Without paying the same significant
political costs, the Council could accomplish eugenic goals by promoting legal
reforms designed to limit population.
Between 1952 and 1960, members of the Council realized that they would
also need to change the structure and image of their pro-eugenic organization.
Those in the organization who considered themselves to be scientists or social
scientists, like Davis and Osborn, were particularly sensitive to frequent comments
that eugenicists had no expertise and that eugenics was not a valid science.102
During and after World War II, critics of eugenic legal reforms increasingly argued
that, like the Nazis in Germany, American eugenicists were politically motivated
and interested only in pseudosciences that would support their own biases.103
Following the publication of a study overseen by the American Neurological
Association in 1936, a growing number of critics asserted that there was no
scientific evidence that compulsory sterilization laws had a eugenic effect.104
Taking up an argument from the published report, critics also questioned the

98

See generally Id.
Id. at 496, 501.
100 See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 496.
101 Id. at 501.
102 See, e.g., Frank Notestein, Frederick Osborn: Demography’s Statesman on His Eightieth Spring,
35 POPULATION INDEX 367, 367-371 (1969) (Notestein and Osborn both frequently referred to
themselves and to one another as scientists or demographers).
103 See, e.g., A Policy on Population?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1951, at B4.
104 ABRAHAM MYERSON ET AL., EUGENICAL STERILIZATION: A REORIENTATION OF THE PROBLEM
(Macmillan 1936).
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validity of the very categories used in various sterilization statutes.105 For some,
the necessary conclusion appeared to be that American eugenics, like Nazi
eugenics, was the product of ideology and political compromise rather than
scientific research.106
In response, the leaders of the Council decided that, for a period of several
years, the organization would refrain from political lobbying and concentrate
instead on funding research.107 By selectively sponsoring and shaping research
projects, the Council’s leaders hoped to collect seemingly objective data that could
later be shown to local administrators and lawmakers. In the early 1950s, leaders
of the organization also decided to emphasize programs that appeared to have
different focuses.108 Arguably, some of these programs were genuinely unrelated
to the Council’s population quality program, especially those involving
environmental preservation, world hunger, and alternative food and fuel sources.109
In other cases, projects were population quality measures in everything but name,
especially proposed “maternal health” initiatives that often focused on discouraging
poor women from having more children.110 In either case, it was important to
members of the Council that the organization appear to be politically neutral and
involved in diverse scientific studies.
By the mid-1950s, several members of the Council also became convinced
that the idea of eugenic reform needed to be reshaped.111 Frederick Osborn, a
prominent member of the Council, was especially interested in the damaged
reputation of eugenic legal reform, because he served as the president of the
American Eugenic Society in the same period.112 In eugenic circles, Osborn had
long considered himself a moderating influence, because he rejected the racist and
racialist accounts of eugenic defects set forth by many eugenicists between 1910
and 1940.113 In the mid-1950s, the response that followed proposals to expand
compulsory sterilization laws was instructive. Few critics of the law defended
unwed mothers on welfare or rejected the idea that a deterrent was needed to
105

March of Science, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1955, at E5.
Rap Outmoded Laws Aimed at Epileptics; Neurologists Demand Revisions, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10,
1954, at 12.
107 For examples of the kind of research project the Council later funded, see, e.g., Victor Wilson,
Science Group Urges World Birth Control, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1963, at 14; see also Jacques Nevard,
India Trying Loop to Reduce Births, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1965, at 12; see also Peter Prugh, Patching
Up Families: Varied New Programs Aim to Curb Breakdown in Negro Home Life, WALL ST. J.,
November 30, 1965, at 1.
108 See Rockefeller, supra note 95 at 494-496 (describing early agenda of Population Council from
founding conference).
109 Many of these concerns were articulated by the organization’s founding members as early as
1952. See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 493.
110 For an example of a similar, but later program, see Jane Brody, Population Group Offers Care
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 1971, at 36.
111 See GORDON, supra note 31, at 281-282 (evaluating involvement of eugenicists in nascent
population control movement) .
112 See id.
113 See Notestein, supra note 102, at 369(explaining Osborn’s role as a moderate in eugenic circles).
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prevent out-of-wedlock births.114 Most often, critics objected only to the fact that
the sterilizations would be compulsory.115
In 1954, Osborn drew on this interest in voluntary sterilization in giving a
new definition of eugenics. Osborn explained,
[t]he largest families should not be found as a characteristic of particular
racial or social or economic groups but among all couples who give
evidence of socially valuable qualities.... There can be no arbitrary
decisions on who should or should not have children. The parents
themselves must make that choice.116

Improving the quality of the population had been described as a separate but
related goal. Later in the decade, several influential politicians expressed interest in
measures to achieve international and domestic population control.117 At the same
time, Council leaders became convinced that it would be difficult to rehabilitate
openly eugenic programs or research studies.118 Efforts to study and propose ways
to improve the quality of the population would have to be more closely connected
than ever to the idea of population control.
The ground for doing so had been laid in the 1930s by demographers like
Notestein and Osborn, who belonged to the eugenic legal reform coalition. Both
Notestein and Osborn had played an important role in the study of so-called
differential fertility.119 It had long been assumed that state governments
developing compulsory sterilization laws wanted to know what measures had to be
taken to ensure that more fit people than unfit people were having children. As a
general matter, eugenicists believed that the unfit were more fertile than the fit.120
As early as 1933, Osborn had posited that low intelligence was closely correlated
with social class.121 He argued that the unfit tended to be poor, and the poor
tended to have more children.122
In the late 1950s, Osborn, Notestein, and other members of the Council
revived the idea of differential fertility in order to repackage the Council’s pro-

114
115
116

See Paul, supra note 63 at 90.
See id.
Frederick Osborn, Population Problems and the American Eugenics Society, SCI., May 1954, at

3A.
117 Ernest Gruening, a Senator from Alaska, was the most vocal supporter of population control
efforts in the early 1960s. See Letter by Eisenhower on Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1965, at 25.
By the middle of the decade, however, population control politics had become less controversial and
more prominent. See THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE,
7-16 (Donald T. Critchlow ed., 2002).
118 Rockefeller and the other founding members carefully avoided the use of the term eugenic, or
any rhetoric associated with it. See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 496.
119 See, e.g., FRANK LORIMER AND FREDERICK OSBORN, DYNAMICS OF POPULATION: SOCIAL AND
BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGING BIRTH RATES IN THE UNITED STATES (Macmillan 1934).
120 See, e.g., Frederick Osborn, Characteristics and Differential Fertility of American Population
Groups, 12 SOC. FORCES 1,4 (1933).
121 See id.
122 See id.
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eugenic reforms.123 If it was widely agreed that population control was desirable,
Osborn argued, one had to check the growth of especially fertile people, and
exceptionally fertile people tended to be “the socially inadequate—those families
who are perennially on relief rolls, the constant problem of the social worker.”124
Thus, if an overall reduction in world and domestic population growth inevitably
improved the quality of population, those interested in eugenics could achieve the
same goals by studying and campaigning for less controversial population control
reforms.125
However, the Population Council’s new focus on population control issues
had a surprising consequence. As Council research emphasized ways to reduce
rates of reproduction among “high fertility groups,” the Council’s research interests
and policy proposals displayed a more overt racial bias. In the early 1960s, the
Council began sponsoring research on ways to reduce growth rates in urban and
rural African-American areas.126 This new research focus reflected two ideas that
were then becoming common among members of the Council. First, the new
research suggested that it would be desirable to reduce the size of the AfricanAmerican population. Second, the research focus demonstrated that a growing
number of Council members believed that the “socially inadequate” were rarely
white.
It may seem counterintuitive that some aspects of reproductive law and
politics were more openly racist in the 1950s and 1960s than they had been before
World War II. This is especially the case because a good deal of current
scholarship on the eugenic legal reform movement of the earlier twentieth century
justifiably emphasizes the anti-immigrant or racist character of the movement.127
There is truth in this argument. Eugenic legal reformers sponsored successful racebased immigration quotas, anti-miscegenation laws, and sterilization programs for
those in segregated hospitals.128
However, for a variety of reasons, compulsory eugenic sterilization laws
were not, for the most part, disproportionately applied to members of racial
minorities before World War II. First, in southern states where racial prejudice was
the strongest, non-white hospitals did not have the equipment or staff to perform a
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See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 115, at 3A.
Frederick Osborn, Qualitative Aspects of Population Control: Eugenics and Euthenics, 25 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 406, 423 (1960).
125 See id.
126 See Research Proposal, “Problems of Bearing and Rearing Children in High-Fertility, LowIncome, Low Education American Families,” (1960) in The Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller
University, POPULATION COUNCIL PAPERS, Box 46, Folder 653.
127 See, e.g., STEFAN KUHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND GERMAN
NATIONAL SOCIALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 2002); see also EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK:
EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE (Thunder’s Mouth Press 2003).
128 See Albert Ernest Jenks, The Legal Status of Negro-White Amalgamation in the United States, 21
AM. J. OF SOC. 666 (1916); W. A. Plecker, Shall We All Be Mullatoes?, LITERARY DIG., March 27,
1925.
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large number of sterilizations. For example, a study of North Carolina’s
compulsory eugenic sterilization law reported that such hospitals were poorly
equipped and performed only a token number of sterilizations.129 Moreover, the
operations that were performed were mostly considered punitive rather than
eugenic measures.130
Second, in the North, sterilizations were still performed primarily on those in
state institutions, regardless of race.131 It is true that some of the “conditions” that
could justify a eugenic sterilization, including alcoholism and unwed motherhood,
were likely to be associated with poverty.132 To the extent that race was correlated
with poverty, members of racial minorities might have been exposed to compulsory
sterilization more often than were Caucasians.
Nonetheless, there is evidence that members of racial minorities were not
disproportionately subjected to sterilization in the North. This was the case for
several reasons.
First, many prominent eugenicists were concerned that
sterilization laws would be considered unscientific if the laws were openly
racist.133 Additionally, African-Americans and Hispanics were sometimes less
likely to be placed in mental institutions.134
In the later 1950s, as evolving eugenic ideology focused on those who
actually had more children, groups like the Council increasingly targeted members
of racial minorities. The new eugenic agenda required the appearance of more
rigorous scientific study and respect for reproductive choice, but that agenda also
produced a more overtly racist set of studies and proposals.
This shift becomes apparent from a study of the work of Donald Bogue that
was sponsored and shaped by the leaders of the Council. A member of the
University of Chicago’s Population Research and Training Center, Bogue began to
receive most of his funding from the Council after 1960.135 The definition of “high
fertility” groups given by Bogue in a request for grant funding was largely based on
race: Bogue listed African-Americans, Puerto-Ricans, Native Americans and white
immigrants as groups with high fertility rates.136 Bogue argued that members of
these groups continued to make wrong choices with respect to family planning
because they were incompetent, unmotivated, or influenced by their own or their
family’s culture.137 What was needed was a program that used all measures short
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WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 29, 33.
Id. at 32.
131 See Kills Wisconsin Bill to Sterilize Insane, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 1925, at 3 (Wisconsin governor
vetoing bill because sterilization applied only to those in institutions).
132 See, e.g., POPENOE, supra note 52, at 268.
133 See, e.g., The Scientist Speaks to Us, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1912, at BR72.
134 See, e.g., WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 38.
135 See Research Proposal, supra note 126 (Bogue’s 1960 proposal reflects the tone and strategies of
several earlier proposals).
136 See id. at 1.
137 Id. at 2.
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of force in order to assure that members of high fertility groups made the right
choices.138
Nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that Bogue and his sponsors were
uniformly uninterested in the lives of the poor or non-white people being studied.
Indeed, Bogue worked throughout the 1960s on projects designed to study and
prevent poverty.139 Nonetheless, Bogue stated that the people he studied were
culturally or genetically dysfunctional and incompetent to make their own
reproductive choices.140
Similar beliefs colored the research and legal reforms outlined by Bogue for
the Council between 1960 and 1968. Beginning with his pilot program in poor,
African-American areas of Chicago, the Council sponsored research on how to get
the contraceptively incompetent to make the choice to have fewer children. A
number of strategies were adopted to increase the probability that the right choices
would be made. Bogue’s assistants sent targeted mailings to people living in
housing projects and advertised in what Bogue called “ethnic newspapers,” like the
Chicago Defender.141 Frequently, he used volunteers who appeared to be objective
or even friendly to dispense advice. African-American volunteers were instructed
to befriend people in the neighborhoods studied before advising them to stop
having children.142 Those with medical training were supposed to characterize
their recommendations as objective medical advice rather than as propaganda put
out by the Council.143
By 1963, Bogue had better articulated his research objectives for the Council.
First, his assistants developed a manual that could be used to get any person in any
region to make the “right” reproductive choice.144 Second, Bogue’s group
collected data on “Negro” fertility and on general correlations between race, class,
and fertility, so that the Population Council would have more concrete findings to
show potential supporters in the government.145
Between 1963 and 1966, the Executive Board of the Council began to agree
with Bogue that a reduction in the size of high fertility groups could be achieved
only through formal legal reform and government financial support and a

138

See id.
See Minutes of a Meeting of the Rockefeller Council Executive Board (May 9, 1966) in The
Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller University, POPULATION COUNCIL PAPERS, Box 56, Folder 903.
140 See id. See also, e.g., Birth Control Facts Urged for Negroes, CHI. TRIB, Apr. 27, 1962, at A2..
141 Research Proposal, Problems of Bearing and Rearing Children in High-Fertility, Low-Income
American Families, *25 (1960) in The Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller University, POPULATION
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Findings, *4 (May 23, 1963) in The Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller University, POPULATION
COUNCIL PAPERS, Box 56, Folder 903.
142 See Research Proposal, supra note 126, at 25.
143 See, e.g., Research Proposal, supra note 126, at 26-27.
144 See Research Proposal, *2 (Nov. 19, 1962) in The Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller University,
POPULATION COUNCIL PAPERS, Box 56, Folder 903.
145 See Research Proposal, supra note 126, at *1, *7-8.
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redefinition of reproductive choice.146 By 1966, Bogue had become deeply critical
of the existing strategies of researchers financed by the Ford Foundation and the
Milbank Fund.147 Instead, Bogue argued, a more “large-scale effort” was needed,
which would require “a great deal of technical assistance from sponsoring
agencies” in government.148
By 1966, many members of the Executive Board of the Council had been
persuaded by Bogue’s arguments. A number of proposals were considered in that
year to maximize governmental funding and involvement at both the state and
federal level, including grants to welfare and health departments to start
contraception programs among high fertility groups, to create federal agencies to
fund research on contraceptive incompetence, and to disseminate pamphlets to the
poor on the benefits of contraception.149
Through working with Bogue and similar researchers, the Council developed
an effective new legal strategy to achieve improvements in the quality of the
population.150 By the late 1960s, none of the Council’s proposals was labeled
eugenic or invoked the use of governmental coercion that had been the hallmark of
earlier eugenic law reforms.151 Indeed, the Council’s new strategy required the
organization’s activists to avoid all overt political lobbying before research on a
particular subject had been carried out.152
It would be a mistake, however, to think that the leaders of the Council were
no longer interested in legal reform. Instead, by collecting seemingly legitimate
academic research results and using private funding, the leaders of the Council
hoped to show governmental agencies and leaders the benefits of enacting the
measures supported by the Council.
Many of the benefits emphasized by members of the Council were thought to
be related to population control, including an improvement in the quality of the
population if the overall rate of growth were reduced.153 However, because of the
organization’s new emphasis on reproductive choice, the leaders of the Council
wanted to avoid any overt reference to quality population or eugenic reform.
Research sponsored by the Council bolstered the theory that the quality of the
population would necessarily be improved if population growth were checked.
This was the case, researchers argued, because the most socially inadequate people
often had the most children. In the eyes of some leaders of the Council, a
population control reform would necessarily have eugenic benefits, and the Council

See Minutes, supra note 139, at 1-3.
See id. at 1.
148 See id. at 2.
149 See id. at 1.
150 See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 495.
151 See Minutes, supra note 139, at 1-3.
152 See id.
153 See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 495.

146

147

@BCL@6C015DC4.DOC

2008]

5/6/2008 7:04:32 AM

REINVENTING EUGENICS

339

would profit from invoking reproductive choice rather than the need for quality
population or eugenic reform.
After focusing on what the Council now called population control, the
organization’s members consistently stressed that they respected an individual’s
reproductive choices. However, what it meant to respect reproductive choice was
itself becoming a subject of debate. Those volunteering in projects for the Council
were to ensure that members of high fertility groups made the right choices. To
accomplish this task, volunteers were told to approach women who had recently
delivered children, because those women were then were physically weak and
emotionally vulnerable.154 Similarly, Council volunteers were told to assume roles
that would make their advice more influential.155 Increasingly, these activities
reflected a belief that particular individuals were intrinsically unable to make the
right choice for themselves.
In several years’ worth of research sponsored by the Council, a definition of
contraceptive incompetence emerged that was connected to both race and class.
Thus, in the later 1960s, as the Council began openly to lobby for its preferred
reforms, a new debate had emerged about the future of American reproductive law.
Instead of questioning whether individual choice should be an important factor in
the debate, the discussion now centered on what the meaning of choice should be.
B. Human Betterment and Selling Sterilization
In many ways, the transformation of the Council into an organization
purportedly interested only in population control was easy: as early as the 1930s,
Osborn and Notestein had written about the eugenic and humanitarian problems
that would follow from unchecked population growth.156 The Human Betterment
Association for Voluntary Sterilization was a different kind of organization.157
Formed in the 1920s by California eugenicists Paul Popenoe and E. S. Gosney,
Human Betterment was founded primarily to promote compulsory eugenic
sterilization laws.158 The leaders of Human Betterment were particularly
committed to the use of compulsory sterilization laws as a eugenic solution.159
After World War II, members of the public were suspicious of the use of such
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Research Proposal, supra note 126, at 26-27.
See, e.g., id.
156 See text accompanying supra notes 119-120.
157 See, e.g., Fred Hogue, Social Eugenics, L. A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1936, at 31 (referring to
organization as Human Betterment Foundation)(The Human Betterment Association for Voluntary
Sterilization, as it was later called, had a dizzying array of names in the years between 1940 and 1966);
see also Fred Hogue, Social Eugenics, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 16, 1939, at II9 (referring to organization as
Human Betterment Association). For ease of understanding, this article will refer to the organization as
Human Betterment.
158 See generally, Hogue, Social Eugenics (1939) supra note 157.
159 See, e.g., Human Sterilization, Human Betterment Foundation, Eugenics Archive, available at
http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/static/images/1753.html.
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sterilization laws.160 Human Betterment’s commitment to the use of coercion and
to sterilization in particular put the organization’s continuing political viability in
doubt.
The reception of proposals to expand compulsory sterilization laws made
apparent the political obstacles Human Betterment’s leaders faced in the 1950s.161
Human Betterment activists remained convinced that only sterilization would
improve the quality of the population, because sterilization required less day-to-day
attention on the part of the individual and was a more permanent contraceptive
solution.162 A majority of the members of Human Betterment also believed that
existing sterilization laws were too narrow: there were socially inadequate persons
who they believed should be sterilized and who did not qualify as insane or
feebleminded under the new, narrow interpretations of eugenic sterilization
laws.163
The fate of Human Betterment between 1945 and 1955 might seem to
suggest that World War II did mark the effective end of eugenic legal reform. In
that period, the organization cycled through a series of names and images, all the
while struggling to find adequate funding.164 By 1955, the leadership of Human
Betterment had concluded that eugenic legal reform was no longer a realistic
solution. Instead, members sought to fund so-called voluntary sterilizations for
people who were not covered by existing sterilization laws but who were still
considered inadequate.165
However, the evolution of Human Betterment tells a story about the
relationship between eugenics and law after World War II that differs from the
traditional account. Without ever changing their goals or preferred methods, the
leaders of Human Betterment effectively campaigned for the removal of state and
federal bans on the use of family planning aid for voluntary sterilization. Instead of
changing the substance of their agenda, members of Human Betterment changed
only their rhetoric. The organization’s leaders concluded that eugenic sterilization
could still be realistically supported so long as the organization advocated
reproductive choice.
Human Betterment’s emphasis on choice grew out of a long correspondence
between its leaders and Hugh Moore, the founder of the Dixie Cup Company. A
160

See text accompanying supra notes 28-30.
See id.
162 See, e.g., Clinic Defended on Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1962, at A1. Ruth Proskauer
Smith, the chairman of the organization’s executive board, explained, “for the poor and uneducated, . . .
surgical birth control is the only answer.” Id.
163 See text accompanying supra notes 60-61.
164 See, e.g., Letter from John Cox, Treasurer of Human Betterment Association, to Hugh Moore
(Jan. 3, 1955) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript
Library, Princeton University; see also Letter from Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith (Apr. 30,
1959) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library,
Princeton University.
165 See Letter from Ruth Proskauer Smith to Hugh Moore (Apr. 4, 1956) in THE HUGH MOORE
PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
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longtime donor to the organization, Moore believed that Human Betterment could
not improve the quality of the population solely by funding private sterilization of
the socially inadequate. 166 In 1961, Moore wrote to Ruth Proskauer Smith, the
executive director of Human Betterment, and suggested a related change of
course.167 Moore recommended that less money be used for actual sterilizations,
so that more could be spent to rehabilitate the image of sterilization.168 If this were
done, Moore asserted, it would be easier to convince people to be sterilized and to
persuade state and federal agencies to support voluntary sterilization. 169 It was
hoped that sterilization might be associated not with Nazism but with human rights
and personal choice.
In 1961, the controversy surrounding a new Virginia voluntary sterilization
law that Human Betterment had advocated made apparent the need to change the
image of sterilization as well as its legal status.170 As a primary goal, the leaders of
Human Betterment had long campaigned for the introduction of statutory
protections for doctors performing voluntary sterilizations.171 Although only three
states explicitly provided for penalties for physicians and patients involved in
voluntary sterilizations, physicians in a majority of states still expressed concern
about potential common law or statutory liability.172 In response, a number of
hospitals restricted the availability of these surgeries.173 In order to increase the
number of voluntary sterilizations, leaders of Human Betterment believed they
would first have to clarify the legal status of the procedure.174
The response to the Fauquier County Project, as Human Betterment activists
termed the Virginia statute, made clear that no more states would adopt similar
laws unless the public was first convinced that the sterilizations were truly
voluntary. At first, the Fauquier County Project appeared to be a victory for
Human Betterment. In March 1961, the Virginia state legislature passed a law
formally authorizing a voluntary sterilization program for “medically indigent”
women.175 Several legislators who favored the bill professed their belief that the
bill would function like a bill that had died in committee, which provided for the

166

See id.
Letter from Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith (Dec. 13, 1961) in THE HUGH MOORE
PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 Charles Windle, Factors in the Passage of Sterilization Legislation: The Case of Virginia, 29
PUB. OP. Q. 306, 306-314 (1965) (providing a contemporary analysis of the reasoning of legislators who
introduced Virginia’s voluntary sterilization law).
171 See Clinic Defended, supra note 162, at A1.
172 See Linda Champlin and Mark Winslow, Elective Sterilization, 113 U.PA.L.REV. 415, 425
(1965)( A contemporary study indicated that doctors would most likely be found liable under either a
common-law or statutory theory of assault and battery or mayhem).
173 Id. at 419.
174 See id.
175 See Windle, supra note 170, at 306-307.
167
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compulsory sterilization of unwed mothers: it would reduce the number of children
born to women on relief.176
Those trained by Human Betterment were instructed to ensure that indigent
patients made the right reproductive choice. First, Human Betterment volunteers
were advised to approach women immediately after they had delivered children, a
time when the women were thought most likely to agree to sterilization.177 In
explaining the procedure, volunteers were similarly advised to emphasize the
advantages of the procedure and to explain its effects in abstract, simple
language.178 In the short term, this strategy seemed to work.179
By 1962, however, the drawbacks of the procedure were apparent. Hospital
officials, like leaders of Human Betterment, were accused of being racist and of
maintaining ties to the eugenic legal reform movement of the earlier twentieth
century.180 Defending her organization in the face of attacks by Catholic and
African-American leaders, Smith argued that the program benefited “the poor and
uneducated... for whom surgical birth control is the only answer.”181 Privately,
however, other leaders of Human Betterment recognized that state governments,
health departments, welfare agencies, and hospitals would not expand the
availability of sterilization unless the procedure was first made less
controversial.182
In the spring of 1962, when Moore and Smith began working with a public
relations agency to rehabilitate the idea of sterilization laws, both Moore and Smith
were convinced that reproductive choice would have to be emphasized.183 Their
goal was straightforward: the leaders Human Betterment could use sterilization as a
eugenic tool only if they changed the political meaning of sterilization. After
working through several drafts with the agency, Smith crafted a statement of
purpose emphasizing human rights, individual choice, and humanitarian concerns
raised by the rate of world population growth. 184 Even Moore was surprised by the
shift in tone seen in the memorandum. He wrote, “[t]he only question I have on
first reading is that HBA is unalterably opposed to compulsory sterilization. I
thought we favored the sterilization of imbeciles and the like in public
institutions.”185
176

See id. at 313, 318.
Gerald Grant, Birth Control Clinic “Amazed” at Sterilization, WASH. POST, Sep. 9, 1962, at

177 See

B1.

178

See Virginians Calm on Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 14, 1962, at 20.
See Clinic Defended, supra note 162, at A1.
180 See id.; see also Nate Haseltine, Only the Wealthy or Ill Are Sterilized Here, WASH. POST, Sep.
12, 1962, at A1.
181 See Clinic Defended, supra note 162, at A1.
182 See, e.g., Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith, supra note 167.
183 Letter from Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith (Mar. 14, 1962) in THE HUGH MOORE
PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
184 See Letter from Hugh Moore to Ruth Proskauer Smith (Oct. 19, 1962) in THE HUGH MOORE
PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
185 See id.
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Moore soon came to believe that the organization could more effectively
improve the quality of the population if members praised voluntary procedures and
individual choice. 186 In accepting the position of President of Human Betterment,
Moore explained, “I had become convinced... that sterilization is one of the most
likely means of saving civilization and that the public should be made aware of it—
and understand what it is. As a businessman, I have spent my life selling ideas, and
by that means, products.”187 What was needed, Moore explained, was a better
effort in “selling sterilization.”188
Between 1961 and 1966, the organization worked to “sell sterilization” by
emphasizing that it was voluntarily chosen. Whenever the organization received a
substantial grant, Human Betterment created a “plan” whereby indigent people in a
particular geographic area would be encouraged to “choose” sterilization.189 The
rest of the organization’s funding went to publicity and “education” programs,
including conferences on voluntary sterilization as a human right or as a matter of
population control.190
Since 1963, Moore had believed that concern about world population control
would help Human Betterment to promote sterilization as much as would an
emphasis on reproductive choice.191 Invoking the threat of world population
growth, Human Betterment pamphlets produced in the mid-1960s argued that
sterilization helped the poor by improving their economic position.192 Sterilization
would not only reduce the number of undesirable persons, but would also help the
poor by reducing overall population growth.193 In practice, Human Betterment
conducted no research and provided no funding for population control measures.
Although Human Betterment pamphlets consistently mentioned an International
Advisory Committee on Population Control, that committee did not meet once or

186 Hugh Moore, Chairman, Human Betterment Ass’n for Voluntary Sterilization, Speech Made in
Acceptance of Position as Chairman (November 20, 1964) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box
15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See, e.g., Letter from Ruth Proskauer Smith to Jesse Hartman (July 15, 1964) in THE HUGH
MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University
(establishing a new Hartman Fund to provide sterilizations for the indigent in Palm Beach and Broward
County and confirming donation for a similar fund for work in Kentucky); Letter from John Rague,
Treasurer of Human Betterment, to Hugh Moore (June 5, 1965) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313,
Box 15, Folder 7, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (announcing the
establishment of a fund named after donor).
190 See Hugh Moore, Fundraising Statement (December 1965) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC
313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
191 See, e.g., Letter from Hugh Moore to Admiral Lewis Strauss (Oct. 23, 1963) in THE HUGH
MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University (“The present
rapidly growing interest in the population explosion is gaining many converts for the idea of
sterilization.”).
192 See, e.g., id.
193 See id.
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receive any funding before 1967.194 Human Betterment’s leaders remained
committed to using sterilization to improve the quality of the population.195 The
idea of population control, like the idea of reproductive choice, was simply an
effective tool in doing so.
By 1967, the organization highlighted issues of reproductive choice in its
ultimately successful campaign to remove a ban on the use of federal OEO family
planning funds for voluntary sterilizations.196 A variety of public health and
welfare officials joined leaders of the organization in calling for the lifting of the
OEO ban.197
The strategy of emphasizing reproductive choice had been effective: by 1971,
the OEO removed the ban on the use of federal funds for voluntary
sterilizations.198 Although Human Betterment had changed its message in order to
accomplish this task, the organization had not fundamentally changed its goals.
Consider the organization’s fundraising letter of 1966: “[o[ver-croweded cities,
polluted air and water, countless unwanted and suffering children, skyrocketing
taxes for welfare! Half of the babies now born from some cities are from indigent
families on relief. Need we say more?”199
Well into the 1960s, Human Betterment remained committed to using reform
to reduce the number of “babies [...] born [... to] indigent families on relief.”200
Leaders of the organization were happy to invoke the idea of reproductive choice in
order to achieve their goals, especially when members of the organization could
define choice for themselves.
III. NORTH CAROLINA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF COMPULSORY STERILIZATION
LEGISLATION
In 1933, North Carolina became one of the last states to adopt a eugenic
sterilization statute.201 Before the decision of Buck v. Bell in 1927, there was
considerable uncertainty about the constitutionality of existing sterilization laws,202

194 Letter from Hugh Moore to John Rague (Oct. 4, 1966) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313,
Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University (“The United States Association for
Voluntary Sterilization has had a letterhead International Advisory Committee for some years, which
has never met.”); see also Letter from Hugh Moore to John Rague, et al. (Apr. 24, 1967) in THE HUGH
MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University (complaining
that committee had still not met).
195 See, e.g., Letter from Hugh Moore to Admiral Lewis Strauss, supra note 191( Moore repeatedly
wrote that population control politics would be an effective tool in promoting sterilization).
196 See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 198-199.
197 See id.
198 See Louis Kohlmeier, In ’72, U.S. Financed 100,000 Sterilizations, CHI. TRIB., December 2,
1973, at A12 (The OEO itself was estimated to have funded as many as 100,000 sterilizations in 1972.
199 Fundraising Letter (November 1966) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 7,
Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
200 See Kohlmeier, supra note 198.
201 Woodside, supra note 1, at 20. See also Eugenics Board of North Carolina Manual (1960).
202 See LANDMAN, supra note 22, at 49.
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but the decision in Buck provided a template for states, including North Carolina,
that wanted to enact sterilization laws of their own.203
Over the next fifteen years, however, North Carolina emerged as one of the
states that most vigorously applied its sterilization policy. A 1957 study of eugenic
sterilization law that was published in the Georgetown Law Review found that only
four states consistently sterilized more than one hundred people a year: California,
Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina.204 According to reports published by North
Carolina’s own Eugenics Board, the number of sterilizations per year between 1947
and 1957 was between four hundred and seven hundred.205 The biennial report
from 1950-1952 noted a record high of 704 sterilizations, up from the prior record
of 468 in the period between 1948-1950.206 If an identification with Nazism
spelled an end for American sterilization laws, it did not do so immediately, at least
not in North Carolina.
An association with Nazism did mean that North Carolina’s law had to
change. After World War II, North Carolina restricted the application of its
compulsory law, limiting it strictly to the mentally ill and clearly handicapped.207
For the first time, the state published a manual intending to ensure certain
procedural protections. No longer could sterilizations occur without the consent of
a family member or, in the case of mental retardation, without the patient’s consent
to an intelligence test.208
These changes reflected the influence of World War II. Nazism was
associated with coercion and broad laws applied to members of the general
population.209 Physicians and eugenics boards found to have gone beyond
sterilizing the clearly mentally ill or handicapped had sometimes been subject to
devastating lawsuits.210 These lawsuits also showed that a sterilization law that
appeared too broad or compulsory would draw considerable criticism.
However, World War II had not changed the motivations behind North
Carolina’s compulsory sterilization law. Indeed, North Carolina did not repeal its
compulsory sterilization law until 1975.211 Strangely, however, it was pro-eugenic
activists who opposed a broader use of compulsory sterilization. Woodside and
other supporters of eugenic policies in North Carolina argued instead that choice
and consent were necessary to the survival of eugenics in law.212 If force were
203

See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 20.
See O’Hara, supra note 2, at 35.
205 See BIENNIAL REP. OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA , 1968, SUMMARY
STATISTICS (1968).
206 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1950-1952 14 (1952).
207 EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL § 50 AT 2, 5 (1960).
208 Id. at § 80.
209 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 23-24.
210 See, e.g. Heiress Sues Her Mother, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1936, at 12; see also Joanna Schoen,
Between Choice and Coercion: Women and the Politics of Sterilization in North Carolina, 1929-1975,
13 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 132, 132 (2001).
211 See Schoen, supra note 210, at 132.
212 See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 71.
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used against unwed mothers, Woodside predicted that “a great deal of hostility
might be stirred up which could jeopardize the whole existence of the law.”213 In
contrast, a law that appeared voluntary would rarely be scrutinized and could be
used more broadly. Woodside argued that “persuasion and argument are
legitimately used [to elicit consent for a sterilization], but compulsion never.”214
This was because only a voluntary law could win popular support in the long term.
She predicted that a voluntary law could even “eliminate the organized opposition
of religious bodies.”215 If officials could convince the public that North Carolina’s
sterilization law was voluntary, Woodside suggested, they would have a freer hand
in coercing unwed mothers into being sterilized. 216
It seems paradoxical for a compulsory sterilization statute to be administered
as a voluntary law. Woodside suggested two interpretations of how such a statute
could function.217 Under one interpretation, the law would be compulsory only as
a formal legal matter, but would in fact be used by doctors willing to help women
otherwise unable to obtain birth control.218 Under the other interpretation, the
doctors and social workers administering the law would claim that they were
sterilizing only those who wanted to be sterilized, because by making such a claim,
the people who administered sterilization statutes could avoid the public scrutiny
and procedural safeguards associated with compulsory sterilization laws. Between
1950 and 1968, the North Carolina statute was applied to women who were less
severely mentally ill, and the argument was made that the women who were
sterilized consented to the operations. The critical question is whether these
sterilizations were voluntary in fact or only in appearance. Answering this question
involves considering the ways in which doctors secured the consent of individuals
who did not understand or request sterilization.
At the outset, it is important to note that many sterilization decisions were
made by doctors and social workers ignoring the formal procedures required by the
Eugenics Board. Between 1945 and 1950, there had already been 200 sterilizations
in a single North Carolina hospital, not all of which were authorized by the
Eugenics Board.219 In one county, 23 of 59 sterilizations performed in one year
were unauthorized.220 Second, by 1950, these doctors had begun to claim that the
sterilizations they administered were chosen voluntarily by the nominally
feebleminded women they approached.221 The transfer of authority to doctors and
social workers changed the administration of North Carolina’s law, especially
because doctors could choose to perform sterilizations without outside attention
213

See id.
Id.
215 Id. at 24.
216 See id.
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218 See Schoen, supra note 210, at 134.
219 WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 49.
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and could thus afford to pay less attention to the formal rules set forth by the
Eugenics Board. As doctors and social workers took greater responsibility for the
administration of sterilization statutes, the enforcement of North Carolina’s law
became more informal and was more likely in violation of procedural protections
specified in state regulations.
Two trends confirm that this was the case. First, a much larger proportion of
sterilizations took place outside state institutions and involved women too healthy
to be confined in those institutions.222 Because these sterilizations were argued to
be voluntary, administrators in the state could sterilize people not sick enough to be
institutionalized—those often characterized as feebleminded—at a greater rate.223
In 1954-56, for example, 219 of the women sterilized were already confined in
state institutions, and only 175 of the women sterilized were outside of state
institutions.224 By 1962-64, as many as 378 women were sterilized outside state
institutions, with only 112 women in state institutions being sterilized.225 This
trend signaled two things. First, it confirmed that sterilization candidates did not
need to be clearly mentally ill. Second, the trend suggests that sterilizations were
more often administered informally and outside the institutions in which operations
were meant to take place.
A second trend makes clear that mental illness was no longer the primary
reason a woman was singled out for sterilization. Of the people sterilized between
1950 and 1968, a growing proportion were women deemed to be feebleminded. In
1954-56, 111 sterilized women had been diagnosed as mentally diseased and 392 as
feebleminded.226 By 1966-68, when as many as 250 sterilized women were still
characterized as feebleminded, only sixteen were diagnosed with a mental
illness.227
Even in the 1920s, many eugenicists acknowledged that
feeblemindedness was not a biological concept but rather a catchall term applied to
behaviors seen to be antisocial or immoral.228 By the 1950s, the scientific validity
of “feeblemindedness” would have been even more in doubt.229 The feebleminded
women sterilized in North Carolina between 1950 and 1968 were less and less
likely to be mentally ill or handicapped.
Instead, they were increasingly likely to be single women who were sexually
active or who were feared to become so in the future.230 In 1954-1956, there were
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See id. at 15.
See id.
224 BIENNIAL REP. OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1954-1956, 13-15 (1956).
225 BIENNIAL REP. OF THE EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1962-1964, 13-15 (1964).
226 See BIENNIAL REP., 1968, supra note 205, at 12-15.
227 See id.
228 See, e.g., POPENOE, supra note 52, at 323.
229 See Henry Nelson, Genetic Experts Split on Controlled Breeding, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 11, 1966, at
A2 (Advances in genetics might not have cast the same doubt on eugenic thinking that it cast on the
terminology of eugenic science).
230 BIENNIAL REP., 1968, supra note 205, at 12-15.
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139 married sterilization patients in North Carolina and 364 unmarried patients.231
By 1966-68, there were only 27 female married patients, and the number of
unmarried female patients remained as high as 244.232 Doctors could sterilize a
disproportionate number of unmarried women who were not obviously
handicapped or ill by claiming that the women themselves wanted to be sterilized.
It is worth asking whether these sterilizations were truly voluntary. There are
three reasons to be skeptical. First, many advocates of sterilization as a birth
control method argued that it was married women with large families and little
money who frequently demanded birth control.233 Similarly, the voluntary
sterilization program operating in Virginia publicized the fact that it primarily
served married women.234 Yet in the period between 1950 and 1968, a smaller and
smaller proportion of women sterilized in North Carolina were married. 235
A second reason to be suspicious of claims that North Carolina’s sterilization
patients chose sterilization is the hostility directed towards unwed mothers. In fact,
North Carolina tried several times to pass a criminal law prescribing sterilization as
a punishment for all women who had had more than a certain number of children
out of wedlock.236 Legislators supporting bills designed to punish unwed mothers
argued that the bills showed “compassion for the persons who [were] unable to
control their sexual desires.”237
In addition, one must consider the racial prejudice openly expressed by some
of the legislators and doctors who discussed so-called voluntary sterilization policy
in the state. Before 1965, most hospitals were segregated and many black hospitals
had neither the equipment nor the staff to perform a large number of operations.238
After Brown v. Board of Education and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
hospitals were gradually desegregated and there was an increase in the proportion
of sterilizations administered to black women.239 These sterilizations reflected
eugenic as well as racial concerns. Throughout the 1950s, politicians, sociologists,
and psychiatrists argued that black women did not have the same morals as did
other women.240
But why, if North Carolina’s Eugenics Board provided more procedural
protections in 1950 than it had before, were doctors more able to circumvent those
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See id.
233 See Clinic Offers Aid by Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 9, 1962, at 60; see also Haseltine, supra
note 180, at A1.
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235 See BIENNIAL REP., 1968, supra note 205, at 12-15.
236 See Harry Golden, Dealing with Illegitimacy, Letters to the Times, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1961,
at 22.
237 Hearing Argues Sterilization, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1959, at A2l
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protections between 1950 and 1968? For the most part, it was because doctors
claimed that these sterilizations were voluntarily chosen.
Woodside’s study reveals some of the techniques used to elicit “consent”
from women who did not or would not want to be sterilized. Many social workers
believed that “immoral” women could not reliably make the “right” choice.
Woodside agreed that “no great success would be expected from the introduction of
birth control to the unintelligent and the socially irresponsible.”241
Under the North Carolina law, Woodside explained, women did not need to
be fully informed about what sterilization meant. At the State Hospital at Raleigh,
patients qualified as feebleminded were not informed about the effect of
sterilization, even though the “feebleminded” included women who had “a history
or likelihood of sexual misdemeanor in the community” who were thought
otherwise to be capable of intelligent choice about sterilization.242 Second, North
Carolina officials accepted the “consent” of a family member even if a sterilization
candidate herself objected.243 At Goldsboro, as at Raleigh, “patients were not
considered to be intelligent [enough] to consent, and the permission of relatives
was considered to be sufficient.”244 But if a family objected and the candidate
consented, the candidate was almost certainly considered competent to consent,
even if she had been diagnosed as feebleminded.245
Another technique involved tricks used to secure the consent of the candidate
herself. At Morgantown Hospital, social workers proposed sterilization as close as
possible to admission to the hospital, when relatives would be most distressed and
likely to consent.246 At Samarcand, an institution for white juvenile delinquents,
social workers pressured minors to consent, since family members of Samarcand
girls often objected to sterilization.247 Other social workers pressured men to be
sterilized. The men proposed instead that their wives be sterilized. 248
These techniques reflected a new idea of choice. Although “voluntary”
choice proved central to the survival of North Carolina’s eugenic law, “voluntary”
choices included those choices made for unwed mothers by other people or by
women who had not been informed about what they had chosen. One North
Carolina social worker summarized this view about “immoral” women and
sterilization: “[y]ou can’t expect them... to be any more sensible about this than
about other things....”249 Those applying North Carolina’s sterilization law often
acted on similar views. As the image of compulsory sterilization law in North
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Carolina changed, pro-eugenic volunteers in the state also worked to redefine
reproductive choice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Eugenic legal reformers had achieved great success by the 1930s. Eugenic
laws used various means to weed out the physically, mentally, or morally defective.
World War II heavily influenced the fate of eugenic law but did not eliminate
eugenics from law altogether. An association with Nazism meant the decline and
ultimate disappearance of compulsory sterilization laws, but not of all of the
eugenic motivations behind those laws.
If anything, a number of factors made the moral element of eugenics seem
more pressing. Calls for integration, the influence of the Cold War, a long-term
increase in national prosperity, a short-term spike in the number of illegitimate
births, and the number of white unwed mothers might have made moral concerns
more central than they had been in prior decades. Many legislators still held beliefs
that immoral parents inevitably had immoral children. In order to prevent
immorality, one had to decrease the number of children born to immoral parents.
This result could be accomplished by reducing the number of children born to unfit
parents or by making immoral parents reform.
If the moral element of eugenics still influenced law, World War II required
eugenic laws to take a different form. Nazism was too much associated with
compulsory sterilization. Legislators considering compulsory sterilization for
unwed mothers instead had to adopt a range of legal alternatives that better
reflected the importance of reproductive choice.
Pro-eugenic organizations similarly had to adapt to the new political climate
by distancing themselves from the openly political groups that dominated the
eugenic legal reform movement of the earlier twentieth century. As importantly,
the organizations had to reshape the very idea of eugenic reform. To a large extent,
activists working for those organizations did so by invoking and redefining the idea
of reproductive choice.
It is a mistake to believe that eugenics disappeared as an important legal
influence. Eugenic rhetoric might have declined, but eugenic motivations and
eugenic laws did not. What made these laws successful was the ability of
lawmakers and organizations to repackage eugenic laws as something more
palatable. The persistence of eugenics in American law shows how an ideology
may be most effective when it is the most subtle. Eugenics proved to be a subtle
legal ideology indeed, capable of disguising itself in many ways, even in the
language of free choice.

